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For several decades, the reincarnation of studies labeled Law and Literature 
has served to enliven, challenge, and threaten traditional legal discourse. 
Always in implicit competition with the interdiscipline of Law and Economics,1 
Law and Literature has withstood (and been strengthened by at least some) 
criticism from within and without. Recognized in late century2 and beyond3 
as one of the primary contributors to North American jurisprudence, Law and 
Literature continues to inspire from both sides of the aisle a discourse not 
so much of ironic abhorrence of the law as of an aspiration to just norms of 
law and an insistence that perennial deviations from such norms are neither 
inevitable nor inexplicable. In many iterations, and in what follows here, 
Law and Literature seeks the reunion of the fi elds, conjuring a 2000-year-
old continuum from Cicero4 to Cardozo5 as a challenge to more obvious and 
more fl awed trajectories, some of which—like the development of mainstream 
Western religious discourse—have arguably brought about these deviations.6
1. See, e.g. GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS (1995). See also David Ray Papke, 
Problems with an Uninvited Guest: Richard A Posner and the Law and Literature Movement 69 B.U.L.Rev. 
1067, 1084 (1989) (review of RICHARD POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, A MISUNDERSTOOD 
RELATION).
2. See generally MINDA, supra note 1, at 164. 
3. See generally JEFFREY MILLER, THE STRUCTURES OF LAW AND LITERATURE (2013).
4. GUYORA BINDER & ROBERT WEISBERG, LITERARY CRITICISMS OF LAW 17 (2000).
5. Benjamin N. Cardozo, Law and Literature, reprinted in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN N. 
CARDOZO 339 (Margaret Hall ed., 1947) [hereinafter SELECTED WRITINGS].
6. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS (1887); RICHARD H. WEISBERG, 
IN PRAISE OF INTRANSIGENCE (2014). Both of these texts, the second heavily infl uenced by 
the fi rst, describe a 2000 year trajectory during which law, narrative, and justice have been 
dissociated.
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This essay fi rst brings the non-specialist reader up to date on the various 
claims, counterclaims, and provocations connected to American Law and 
Literature scholarship. It reveals that the fi eld has burst through to dynamic 
invocations in many other countries. Finally, it restates what is always already 
there in the modern version of the interdiscipline: the rigorous assessment 
through stories of the way law operates, of how it is interpreted by its major 
speakers, and of how—above all—its minor, major, and catastrophic errors can 
be traced through the unique medium of stories to idiosyncratic deviations in 
the words and deeds of authoritative lawyers and judges. The path to justice 
always is readily available in these stories; it is the identifi able reason for its 
denial that helps the practitioner understand and correct why law so often 
goes terribly wrong. The claim is that only fi ctional narratives, which move 
through time together with characters whose actions and words are revealed, 
permit us to understand dynamically the jurisprudence of our era.
From the mid-1990s to the present, scholars have off ered descriptive 
accounts of the Law and Literature movement, both in the United States and 
abroad. As Peter Brooks has recently put it, they have analyzed closely “not 
quite what you would call a school but nonetheless a set of perspectives, an 
agenda for research, an aspiration to cross-disciplinary understanding.”7 My 
favorite assessments range chronologically from Gary Minda’s Postmodern Legal 
Movements,8 to Elizabeth V. Gemmette’s mid-’90s survey of almost 100 Law 
and Literature courses off ered in the U.S. and Canada,9 to Sarat, Frank and 
Anderson’s recent set of essays in Teaching Law and Literature,10 to Brooks’ The 
Humanities and Public Life.11 Newcomers to the fi eld should also be aware of its 
ascendancy in such places as the U.K.,12 the continent of Europe,13 Australia,14 
the Mideast,15 and Latin America.16
7. Peter Brooks, Law, Literature: Where Are We?, in TEACHING LAW AND LITERATURE 61 ( Austin Sarat, 
Cathrine O. Frank & Matthew Anderson eds., 2011) [hereinafter TEACHING].
8. MINDA, supra note 1, at 149-166. 
9. Elizabeth V. Gemmette, Law and Literature: Joining the Class Action, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 665 (1995).
10. TEACHING, supra note 7.
11. PETER BROOKS, THE HUMANITIES AND PUBLIC LIFE (2014).
12. See MICHAEL FREEMAN & ANDREW LEWIS, LAW AND LITERATURE (1999).
13. See, e.g., Christian Biet, L’Empire du Droit, les Jeux de la Littérature, EUROPE REVUE LITTERAIRE 
MENSUELLE, Apr. 2002, at 7; La Démocratie, Peut-Elle Se Passer de Fictions?, RAISONS POLITIQUES, 
no. 3, 2007, at 1-129; HERMANN WEBER, RECHT UND JURISTEN IM SPIEGEL VON LITERATUR 
UND KUNST (2014); HELLE PORSDAM & THOMAS ELHOLM, DIALOGUES ON JUSTICE (2012).
14. See JOHN FROW, GENRE (2006).
15. See MOSHE SIMON SHOSHAN, STORIES OF THE LAW (2012); Nili Cohen, The Betrayed (?) Wills of 
Kafka and Brod, 27 L. & LITERATURE 1 (2015).
16. See Vera Karam de Chueiri, Direito e Literatura, in DICIONÁRIO DE FILOSOFIA DO DIREITO,233-35 
(Vicente de Paulo Barretto ed., 2006).
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Gary Minda’s late-century assessment of the fi eld remains authoritative; in 
it he locates the jurisprudential move still thought by many to be signally 
important:
Literary jurisprudence uses the great books of literature as a medium for 
discovering insight about meaning, use of rhetoric, and the values of the law . 
. . . Narrative jurisprudence relies on the analyst to develop the text of a story for 
appraising the narrative content of the offi  cial stories told by law.17
Minda’s relatively early account responds avant la lettre to three developments 
in the fi eld that have followed. First, it fortells that any schematic subdivision 
of Law and Literature (say into law/in, law/as, or stylistics) would detract from 
its theoretical and practical contributions. Narrative jurisprudence confl ates 
these subdivisions, necessarily serving all equally well, because the law in 
literature already involves the central hermeneutic challenges artifi cially labeled 
the law as literature and at the same time emphasizes style,18—an awareness that 
style and substance are linked.19 It unpacks the importance of writing not as 
ornament but as central to the determination of a text’s value, its rightness or 
wrongness. Literature was not being mined for goodness; it was the locus as 
well for the most powerful kinds of badness, including especially interpretive 
and stylistic cruelty, a textual ressentiment replete with “organic mendacity” 
and pointing to a more pervasive illness in public and especially legal 
discourse. Thus Minda applauds Robin West’s “imaginative interpretation 
of Kafka’s The Trial . . . to expose the limitations in the mindset of Richard 
Posner’s Economic Analysis of Law”20 while at the same time Minda perceives the 
formal twinning of legal narrative and certain literary genres. The very idea 
that stories often replicate law as a matter of form has become in the twenty-
fi rst century a kind of genre criticism within Law and Literature, claiming as 
does Honni van Rijswik in 2015 that “[g]enres not only construct ‘schematic 
worlds’ with their own ‘defi nitions of space, time, moral ethos and players’ 
but can reveal something of how worlds—including legal worlds—are created 
and maintained.”21 And Minda also was among the fi rst to see literature and 
law as linked “performative enterprises,”22 narratives that (for better or worse) 
have “operative signifi cance in bringing about specifi c kinds of actions,” thus 
already adding to the usual triad a scholarly and audience-related component 
17. MINDA, supra note 1, at 155.
18. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 255-95 (1998); Linda Berger, A Revised View 
of the Judicial Hunch, 10 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 1 (2013); Linda Berger, Applying New 
Rhetoric to Legal Discourse: The Ebb and Flow of Reader and Writer, Text and Context, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
155 (1990).
19. Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, Law and Literature, in SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 340.
20. MINDA, supra note 1 at 159.
21. Honni van Rijswijk, Encountering Law’s Harm Through Literary Critique: An Anti-Elegy of Land and 
Sovereignty, 27 L. & LITERATURE 237, 239 (2015).
22. MINDA, supra note 1, at 63.
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of Law and Literature that had been proposed by Pierre Schlag, among 
others,23 and that fi nds its recent concomitant in widely publicized debates 
about famous trial scenes,24 or actual jury trials or appellate arguments before 
sitting judges whose task it is to “re-try” characters such as Shylock.25
Minda downplayed carving Law and Literature into handy schematic 
pieces. His early account constitutes an answer to subsequent chronological 
schemas such as Julie Stone Peters’,26 which subdivide the fi eld decade by 
decade (“legal humanism” in the 1970s; “hermeneutics” in the ’80s; “narrative”—
through feminist theory and critical race theory—in the ’90s). He also declined, 
correctly, to fi nd that law makes powerful diff erences while stories are lovely, 
open-ended and powerless.27 Reactions of audiences over time indicate that, 
for better or worse, the New Testament and Hamlet have infl uenced behavior more 
than have Brown v. Board or Roe v. Wade.
Julie Stone Peters’ more substantive claim, inspiring responses from 
Brooks and me, to which she in turn responded, attempted to fi nd incurable 
anomalies in the implicit goal of reconstituting a Ciceronian unity between 
law and literature. She found instead “each discipline’s splitting and transfer 
of disciplinary desire: to project the humanist real onto literature [as the law 
professors were doing] was implicitly to accept the law as a system of utilitarian 
calculus; to project the political real onto law [as she claims literary folks were 
doing] was implicitly to acknowledge the inconsequence of the aesthetic.”28 
Thus, she argued, each partner’s desire for the “real” within the other only 
reinforced, by confessing, its side’s traditional unidisciplinary essence: The 
law was powerful but formalistically blind, while literature was beautiful but 
powerless.29
Julie Stone Peters’ critique from the literary side (though she is also a 
lawyer) found echoes from law professors such as Robert Weisberg and 
Gyora Binder, whom she cites, but she avoids their absurd argument that 
literary jurisprudence is “sentimental,”30 a claim belied by the rigorous value 
demolition instigated by close readings of stories that proff er Nietzschean-
level correctives otherwise unavailable in mainstream legal scholarship. The 
argument Peters makes, that each side’s extradisciplinary desire for a “real” to 
23. Id. at 283, n.4.
24. Tom Goldstein, Once Again Billy Budd is Standing Trial, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1988, at B9.
25. Elizabeth Widdicombe, The Bench: Re-trial of Shylock, NEW YORKER, Dec. 22, 2008, at 4. See also, 
Rachel Donadio, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Presides Over Shylock’s Appeal, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2016.
26. Julie Stone Peters, Law, Literature, and the Vanishing Real: On the Future of an Interdisciplinary Illusion, 
120 PUBS. OF MOD. LANGUAGE ASSOC. 442 (2005), reprinted in TEACHING, supra note 7, at 71.
27. MINDA, supra note 1, at 158-9. See also for this proposition, DANIEL KORNSTEIN, KILL ALL THE 
LAWYERS, ch. 16 (1994). See also Weisberg, INTRANSIGENCE, supra n. 6, ch. 5
28. Stone Peters, Law, Literature, and the Vanishing Real: On the Future of an Interdisciplinary Illusion in 
TEACHING 80, supra note 7.
29. Id.
30. BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 4, at 17-18.
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be found in the other paradoxically undermines the project of reunifi cation 
through Cicero or Cardozo, is rearticulated more simply in the quite recent 
account of Paul Kahn. He describes his experiences as a humanist set adrift 
from the Yale Law School’s social scientifi c mainstream. Kahn’s look at his 
Yale colleagues exposes the fi ercely defended unidisciplinary sense of what 
Peters called the “real” and shows it to be far more phantasmagorical than any 
implicit longing in Law and Literature studies:
Of course I am not the only humanist working in the building [Kahn says of 
the Yale Law School], but all of us suff er from the sense that we are merely 
ornamental: We are tolerated in order to make the school more attractive to the 
rest of the university. My colleagues frequently ask me, “What is the evidence 
to support your claims about the nature of law or the legal imagination?” 
They expect me to cite polling data or perhaps to design social psychology 
experiments. How else can we “know” what people think? I respond that 
there is no reason to prefer a poll to a fi lm, and that we learn what people 
think by looking at the products of their imaginations—books, poetry, fi lms, 
political rhetoric, judicial opinions, performances, and practices.31
Could it be that traditional legal thought in 2016, more than narrative 
and literary jurisprudence, reveals Peters’ “projected desires in search of a 
phantom”?32 The desire is to maintain law as an autonomous discipline, and 
to avoid reducing law professors’ salaries when it comes out that law and 
literature are the same; and the phantom is whatever methodology—so long as 
it is “scientifi c”—most distances law from its natural literary twin. In this way, 
history unhappily repeats itself. When Charles Reich33 and Robert Cover34 
began discussing Billy Budd, Sailor35 as text and method, their Yale colleague 
Arthur Leff  declared himself terrifi ed. What, he asked, was happening to 
the “correct answer available through doctrine, neutrality, and formalism?”36 
He continued: “The critical questions were henceforth no longer to be those 
of systematic consistency but of existential operations . . . . Terrifying . . . 
because they required law professors to become experts on good and evil.”37 
The memory of Reich and Cover has been “Yale-ifi ed” by expunging it of all 
its provocations to law and by creating only isolated moments and spaces for 
thinkers like Paul Kahn.
31. BROOKS, supra note 11, at 116.
32. Julie Stone Peters, Reply [to Weisberg], 121 PUBS OF MOD. LANG. ASSOC. 548 (2006).
33. MINDA, supra note 1, at 69-70.
34. Id. at 77, 151.
35. HERMAN MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, SAILOR (Simon & Schuster Paperback Ser. 2009) (1924).
36. MINDA, supra note 1, at 75.
37. Id. at 78.
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So which real is real? In a brief two-part conclusion, I need fi rst to reemphasize 
that Law and Literature, under that rubric as opposed to alternatives such 
as Law and Humanities or Law and Culture, is alive and well at home and 
abroad. As Robert Weisberg has demonstrated, “other pairings just don’t 
seem to generate the same productive friction.”38 And recent scholars have 
opined, with Robin West, that:
. . . the law and culture movement now seems more an outgrowth of the law 
and literature movement than a critical alternative to it . . . . To the degree that 
culture encompasses literature, this development is obviously an overdue and 
welcome expansion of the law and literature movement. [However,] [o]ne 
stark diff erence between the movements cuts the other way. One of the central 
scholarly and pedagogical projects of the law and literature movement—to 
read literature for its substantive contribution to our understanding of law—
has no real analogue in cultural legal studies, at least to date.39
The force of the interrelation thus specifi cally reiterated, I turn to my second 
and more important claim: the merger of law and literature, as Minda fi rst 
argued, brings forth a jurisprudence that is as methodologically incomparable 
as it is substantively appealing.
We are still a long way from fi guring out how our legal institutions so often go 
so badly wrong. Literary and narrative jurisprudence provide insights that are 
unique, which means (redundantly) that they are unavailable in more traditional 
jurisprudential approaches. This methodology goes beyond, although it 
values tremendously, the close reading of legal texts. Close readings of judicial 
texts have always been part of Law and Literature studies.40 These insist on 
narrative not as ornament but as weapon. Legal authorities reach good results 
when they organize words soundly, and they err (sometimes badly) when they 
bring words and structure to the service of unjust outcomes.41 But when these 
close readings are juxtaposed to the wisdom gained from stories about law, 
literary jurisprudence takes on its exceptional quality. And its key insight is the 
revelation that neither judicial error nor infi nite interpretive maneuverability 
is endemic to law, at least law as soundly practiced. Neither close scrutiny of 
legal texts nor close readings of stories about law demonstrate the inevitability 
of unjust legal outcomes. Within the stories of the law, a pathway to a sound 
and fair outcome always exists. To discover it, you just have to be careful and 
persistent, using your ordinary lawyer-like skills.
38. Austin Sarat, Cathrine O. Frank & Matthew Anderson, Introduction, in TEACHING, supra note 
7, at 4 (introducing Robert Weisberg’s piece in the book).
39. Robin West, Literature, Culture, and Law at Duke University, in TEACHING, supra note 7, at 98, 99 .
40. See generally JAMES BOYD WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (1973).
41. RICHARD H. WEISBERG, POETHICS: AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW AND LITERATURE (1992).
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Literary jurisprudence thus denies some inevitable cycle of blindness and 
cruelty, of indeterminacy and interpretive fl exibility, which compel a legal 
system to persecute, misunderstand, and even destroy the outsider and the 
powerless. Of course, in writers such as Dostoyevsky,42 Camus,43 Bernard 
Malamud,44 Friedrich Duerrenmatt,45 William Faulkner,46 or Katherine Anne 
Porter,47 to name just a few, judicial error happens almost constantly.48 But 
literary jurisprudence recognizes and emphasizes that these story-tellers are 
careful to demarcate a potential road to soundness, often embodied in a lawyer 
who (tragically) winds up being defeated. This injustice, however, is not 
systemic; it happens because of negligent, reckless, or willful missteps taken 
by other judicial fi gures in the story. As usually cannot be done in an actual 
investigation, the reader of such narratives moves back and forth through its 
pages to detect with complete precision the fateful detours from accuracy, the 
internal fl aws that lead some characters to distort the law, and the concomitant 
attack by such legalistic wrong-doers on those who would stand in their way.
Narrative jurisprudence avoids the total broadside against law of other 
critical movements. Something happens when institutions speak and write 
wrongly, something that can be traced and grasped. Stories, because they move 
through time within a verbal medium—exactly as legal resolutions do!—
uniquely and clinically identify the sources of interpretive distortion and the 
marred narratives that follow. As a powerful form of forensic representation, 
they off er the reader a look at reality that is most closely analogous perhaps to 
a video, which can be run countless times just by turning back the story’s pages 
to its relevant narrative moments. This process within the reader of letting 
her “fi ngers do the walking” to-and-fro within the story reveals that error is 
not a norm but rather a byproduct of demonstrable malignancies within the 
interpreter/speaker. Some of these authoritative deviations are of such long 
standing that, like the Yale Law School threatened by literary jurisprudence, 
we tend to move back to them as though they were normal.49
Law and Literature seeks, though the quest may take longer than a few 
academic cycles, to revivify and restore the very idea of narrative soundness.
42. FYODOR DOSTOYEVSKY, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (Sidney Monas trans., Signet Classics 
1980) (1866); FYODOR DOSTOYEVSKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV (Constance Garnet trans., 
Barnes & Noble Pub. 1995) (1881).
43. ALBERT CAMUS, THE STRANGER (Matthew Ward trans., Vintage Int’l 1988) (1942).
44. BERNARD MALAMUD, THE FIXER (1966).
45. FRIEDRICH DÜRRENMATT, DIE PANNE [THE BLOW-OUT] or [A DANGEROUS GAME] (1959).
46. WILLIAM FAULKNER, INTRUDER IN THE DUST (Vintage Books 1991) (1948).
47. Katherine Anne Porter, Noon Wine, in THE COLLECTED STORIES OF KATHERINE ANNE PORTER (1979).
48. WOLFGANG HOLDHEIM, DER JUSTIZIRRTUM ALS LITERARISCHE PROBLEMATIK (1968). An 
excellent partial translation is by Marguerite D. Allen, Judicial Error as a Literary Theme (1969), 
Defi ning the Theme, 7 CARDOZO STUD. IN L. AND LITERATURE 117 (1995).
49. Richard H. Weisberg, Law and Literature in Dialogue, A Response to Peters, 121 PUBS. OF MOD. 
LANG. ASSOC. AM 546 (2006).
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